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Does Decentralization ³Bring the People to Government´? An Empirical Analysis of the 
Effect of Decentralization on Political Trust 
 
Abstract 
While much has been said about the political benefit of decentralization, the actual effect of 
decentralization on political trust has not been adequately studied. This study offers an empirical 
examination of the effect of decentralization on political trust at the individual level across 47 
countries. A comparative analysis finds that while at the country level decentralization might be 
positively associated with political trust measured as an aggregate variable, none has a direct 
effect on political trust at the individual level. Instead, our results suggest that the trust-boosting 
effects of decentralization manifest indirectly through attenuating the negative effect of 
democratic values on political trust.   
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Does Decentralization ³Bring the People to Government´? An Empirical Analysis of the 
Effect of Decentralization on Political Trust 
 
Introduction 
The recent decades have witnessed the rise of ³critical citizens´ and the decline of political trust 
around the globe (Citrin 1974; Dalton 2004; Norris 1999; Pharr et al. 2000; Putnam 2002). Given 
the critical importance of political trust for regime stability and governance (Hetherington 1998; 
Hetherington 2005; Rudolph and Evans 2005), various institutional and policy innovations have 
been introduced in part to build or rebuild public confidence in political institutions and political 
system (Tolbert 2003; Blind 2006; Morgeson, VanAmburg, and Mithas 2011). Decentralization, 
in particular, with its promises to increase the efficiency of government service (Tiebout 1956; 
Huther and Shah 1996; Oates 1972; 1999), to reduce the extent of corruption (Tabellini 2000; 
Persson and Tabellini 2000), and to enhance civic and political participation (Dahl and Tufte, 
1973; Frandsen, 2002; Diamond and Tsalik 1999), is believed to be one of such reform policies 
that can fulfill the ever increasing democratic demands of ordinary citizens. It is argued that 
decentralization can ³EULQJ government back to the people,´ which in turn increases FLWL]HQV¶
affection towards government (Diamond, 1999:124-125; Escobar-Lemmon and Ross 2013; 
Hisky and Seligson, 2003: 68). 
 Does decentralization really contribute to boost political trust among individual citizens? 
While the literature of decentralization is massive, the actual effects of decentralization on 
political attitudes in general and on political trust in particular have not been adequately 
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examined.  The extant studies either focus on aggregate outcome of decentralization at country 
level or concern the influence of decentralization within individual countries. To fill the gap, we 
intend to offer a comparative investigation of the effect of decentralization on how ordinary 
people perceive government, that is, citizens¶ trust in political institutions. Rather than simply 
testing its direct effect, we also explore the indirect effect of decentralization by examining its 
influence on the relationship between democratic orientation and political trust. As revealed in 
earlier studies, political trust links contextual attributes of a political system with orientations of 
individuals (Weatherford 1992; Norris 1999; Dalton and Anderson 2011).  Both micro 
mechanisms like individuals¶ democratic orientation and such macro context as decentralization 
in which these micro mechanisms take place are involved in trust formation. Moving from this 
assumption, we hypothesize that the effect of decentralization on political trust does not only 
PDQLIHVWGLUHFWO\LQLQGLYLGXDOV¶DWWLWXGHVEXWDOVRWKURXJKFRQWH[WXDOL]LQJDQGWKXVPRGHUDWLQJ
the relationship political trust and its various correlates, in particular, democratic values. People 
holding greater democratic values tend to trust government institutions less, but this negative 
association is weaker in a more decentralized system. 
 Employing a multi-level analysis of the World Value Survey data (WVS 2005-2006), we 
found that the effect of decentralization is neither direct nor universal as commonly assumed. 
First, while at the country level various measures of decentralization are significantly associated 
with country-averaged institutional trust in different directions, we find that this relationship 
does not hold at the individual level. This not only indicates ecological fallacy of inference from 
country-level association, but also suggests that we cannot assume a simple direct effect of 
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decentralization on political trust. Second, when examining political trust at individual level, we 
find that there are significant interaction effects between decentralization and democratic attitude. 
This implies that the actual influences of decentralization on political trust work through 
moderating the relationship between political trust and democratic values.  
 Moreover, at both aggregate and individual level, we find that different forms of 
decentralization have variant impacts on political trust. In aggregate analyses, both fiscal and 
administrative decentralization are positively associated with trust; but political dimension of 
decentralization is negatively associated with trust. Similarly, at the individual level, both fiscal 
and administrative decentralization attenuates the negative effect of democratic value on political 
trust; but political decentralization aggravates the negative effect of democratic value. Finally, 
the effect of decentralization is more evident in democratic countries than in authoritarian 
countries. Before presenting our analyses and results, we first turn to the related literature to 
ground our expectations regarding the effect of decentralization on political trust. 
 
Decentralization and its political consequences 
Although theories that directly link decentralization and political trust are sparse, a review of the 
literature suggests that decentralization is widely perceived to be able to promote political trust 
(Diamond, 1999; Vetter 2002; Bovaird and Loeffler 2005). Decentralization helps promote 
political trust in ways: first, it improves the relationship between government and its citizenry, 
and, second, it enhances government performance and output. 
 Through two mechanisms, decentralization is expected to improve the relationship between 
Commented [NH1]: If we argue aggregate level analysis is 
unreliable, we may not present aggregate outcomes.   
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the government and the citizens. First, power devolution shortens the distance between political 
authorities and citizenry and thus increases the sense of empowerment of the latter (Blind 2006). 
Provided with considerable power devolution, local government and politicians become more 
visible, which increases citizens¶ perceptions of the access to policy makers and institutions 
(Dahl and Tufte, 1973; Frandsen, 2002). This increased proximity helps people develop an 
articulate understanding of government agencies, making them more confident of the incentives 
of the government agencies. Compared to their counterparts in a decentralized system, citizens in 
a decentralized system are more likely believe that the misbehaviors of officials will be relatively 
easily caught under their watch. 
 Second, decentralization helps increase citizens¶ trust in political institutions by fostering 
political participation (Escobar-Lemmon and Ross 2013; Smith 2009; Campbell 2003; Oats 1999; 
De Mello 2004).When decision-making authority is devolved to lower levels of government, 
citizens are provided with more opportunities to be engaged in policy making process. 
Particularly, local constituents who are marginalized at the national level are more motivated to 
participate in decision making because they are better informed about the local affairs and more 
knowledgeable about local officials (Shah 1998), and local affairs are more related to their 
interest. The increased political and civic engagement in political process LQFUHDVHVFLWL]HQV¶
political efficacy, which in turn help boost trust in political institutions. 
 In addition to improvement of the relationship between the citizens and the government, 
decentralization is expected to deliver better government performance which also in turn helps 
cultivate political trust (Brennanand Buchanan, 1980; Montinola et al., 1995). First, 
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decentralization, as Tiebout (1956DUJXHVVKRUWHQVWKH³LQIRUPDWLRQDOGLVWDQFH´EHWZHHQWKH
providers and recipients of public goods and services, and thus enhances government provision 
of those goods and services (De Mello, Luiz R. 2004). A decentralized government can better 
address regional disparities in cultural heritage, environment, preferences and needs, endowment 
of natural resources, and economic and social institutions (De Mello, 2004; Tiebout 1956; Huther 
and Shah 1996; Oates 1999). A citizenry experiencing better government performance tends to 
believe that the government is willing and able to work for his/her interest, an essential element 
of political trust. 
 Second, decentralization helps control corruption, which is one of the main causes of trust 
declining (Mishler and Rose 2001; Seligson 2002; Anderson and Tverdova 2003). In a more 
decentralized government, politicians are held directly accountable for their performance in that 
people evaluate government performance based on the situation of their neighboring localities 
(Tabellini2000; Persson and Tabellini 2000; Lederman, Loayza, and Soares 2005). The closer 
scrutiny by the citizenry decreases the incentives for the local government officials to engage in 
corruption (Dincer 2010; Shah 2006). In addition, decentralization is often accompanied with 
increased competition between local governments for investment and other resources. This 
competition reduces the ability of bureaucrats to extract rents in exchange for services and 
discourages government from establishing interventionist and distortionary policies (Jin et al. 
1999; Brennan and Buchanan 1980; Qian and Weingast 1997). 
 It should be noted that, however, decentralization can also lead to negative consequences, 
and the general relationship between decentralization and its political consequences still remains 
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unsettled in empirical studies (De Mello and Barenstein 2002, Fismand and Gatti 2002b; 
Treisman 2007a, 2007b). It is suggested that decentralization, by transferring considerable 
powers and resources to local government, introduces additional principal-agent problems. One 
FRPPRQV\PSWRPLVWKH³RYHUJUD]LQJ´RIWKHVRFLHW\DQGLQFUHDVHGOHYHORIFRUUXSWLRQZKHQ
subnational governments are granted more autonomy to regulate economic activities (Shleifer 
and Vishny 1993). If the empowered local institutions revert to elite control, decentralization 
may undermine public support for political system (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000; Hiskey and 
Seligson 2003). Some empirical studies suggest that decentralization may in fact increase 
people¶s perception of corruption (Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005). 
 Unfortunately, most efforts of empirical studies have been devoted to investigating the effect 
of decentralization on corruption or other aggregate effects at country level (Fisman and Gatti, 
2002a; Fisman and Gatti 2002b; Fan, Lin, and Treisman 2009). While aggregate effects of 
decentralization are important, it is also, if not more, imperative to examine how individuals 
respond to the institutional reforms of decentralization. Hiskey and Seligson (2003) and 
Escobar-Lemmon and Ross (2013) are two studies that turn attention to the direct effect of 
decentralization on individual attitudes. But both studies focus on one country, Bolivia and 
Columbia respectively, and concern only the variation within country. de Mello (2004) 
conducted the only cross-national study testing the effect of decentralization on attitudes of 
ordinary citizens towards government. However, he DJJUHJDWHGLQGLYLGXDOV¶FRQILGHQFHLQ
government for countries and tested the effect of fiscal decentralization on country-averaged 
government support. In short, there lack direct comparative tests of the relationship between 
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decentralization and individual attitudes across countries.1 One way of advancing the debate 
would be to subject the competing arguments to a comprehensive and comparative test of the 
effect of decentralization, as an aggregated variable, on political trust for government institutions, 
measured at the individual level. 
 
Decentralization as a moderating contextual variable 
Driven by recent advancement of contextual analysis, we further posit that the relationship 
between decentralization and political trust does not only manifest in a direct manner. More 
importantly, decentralization provides an institutional context in which factors at the individual 
level take effect on political trust. That is, the effect of decentralization also works through 
shaping and moderating the relationship between political trust and its correlates at the individual 
level. Causal heterogeneity is a concern in much of the political science literature. Przeworski 
and Teune (1970, 74; Western 1998; Steenbergen and Jones 2002), for example, argue that 
comparative research focus mainly on ³the [contextual] influence of larger systems upon the 
characteristics of units within them.´ A burgeoning body of recent literature specifically raises 
the attention to contextual causality, arguing that any causal relationship happens in a context and 
context is likely to generate heterogeneous causality (Falleti and Lynch 2009; Morgan and 
Winship 2011; Geddes 2007). Corresponding to the conceptual understanding of the 
context-induced causal heterogeneity, recent years have witnessed an increasing number of 
studies employing multi-level models to address issues with cross-level nature. In light of this, 
                                                             
1 An exception is a working paper by Ligtart and Oudheusden (2011). We differ from their study as well.  
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we believe that decentralization constitutes an environment for which individuals evaluate 
political system based on their individual attributes, including socio-economic ones or attitudinal 
ones. Therefore, its effect should manifest through shaping the relationship between political 
trust and its covariates and this relationship generates heterogeneous effect for people with 
different attributes.   
We in this study particularly investigate the moderating effect of decentralization on the 
effect of democratic value on political trust. Among various individual factors of political trust, 
we stress the interactive effect of democratic value and decentralization for two major reasons. 
First, the increase of democratic citizens is believed a major reason for trust decline worldwide. 
,QWKHOLWHUDWXUHRISROLWLFDOWUXVWRQHRIWKHPDMRUILQGLQJVLVWKDWWKHULVHRI³FULWLFDOFLWL]HQV´
contributes to the general erosion in political trust.  Internalized values, like democratic values, 
determine the benchmark against which individuals evaluate the regime in general and the 
political institutions in particular. In authoritarian regimes, those who strongly believe in 
democratic values therefore are unlikely to trust its institutions. Empirical studies in 
non-democracies have found a significant and negative correlation between democratic values 
and support for the political regime (Chen 2004; Geddes and Zaller 1989). Yet, even in 
democratic countries, democratically minded individuals higher democratic ideals make the 
public more critical of the actual operations and practices of democratic systems. Dalton, for 
instance, found that the declining political support in these societies has a lot to do with the 
FLWL]HQV¶ULVLQJGHPRFUDWLFDVSLUDWLRQV³>:@KDWLVFKDQJLQJLV citizen expectations of what 
GHPRFUDF\VKRXOGDFKLHYH« and it is of this higher standard that contemporary politicians and 
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political institutions fall short. (Dalton 2004, 109)´ Presumably because many democratic 
governments have been slow to respond to higher democratic ideals held by 
democratically-minded citizens, structural decline of political trust is widespread in established 
democracies (Inglehart 1990, 1997;Norris 1999; Dalton 2004).  
Second, democratic value is stressed in this study because decentralization is in essence a 
democratic institutional reform that supposedly meets the rising democratic demands (Diamond 
1999). On the face value, a decentralized system is a more democratic system and meets the 
moral need of democratic citizens for a political system. In a decentralized system, political 
power is rearranged to be more dispersed vertically. In such a way, decentralization introduces 
another dimension of checks and balance in political system. Decentralization also makes a 
polity more inclusive and renders a larger portion of government officials and institutions at local 
levels under the watch of the public. Such newly added democratic features serve to soften the 
negative feeling of democratic citizens towards government institutions that have long been 
perceived to fail democratic standards in norm. 
In addition, we believe that the individuals with stronger democratic minds are more likely 
to respond positively to decentralization because the effects of decentralization listed in the 
previous section pertain mostly to those people. First, decentralization can ease the critical 
citizens¶ distrust in political institutions by enabling them to participate in political processes to a 
greater extent (Campbell 2003).A reason of declining public confidence in various political 
institutions and actors is about citizens¶ increasing demand of democratic citizens in participating 
in political process (Huntington 1981; Inglehart 1999; Dalton 2004). Such demands have been 
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particularly problematic for national politics given the prohibitive cost and institutional restraints 
of attending political process at the national level. Decentralization help solve this problem by 
expanding the scope of participation, increasing the access to policy decision, and lowering the 
cost of political participation. It therefore increases the affection of democratic citizens, 
especially those marginalized at the national level, towards political institutions. 
 Second, decentralization, by enhancing the efficiency and quality of government 
performance, can also ease the criticism of democratic citizens. In modern politics, largely due to 
PHGLD¶VFULWLFDOUHSRUWLQJFLWL]HQVDUHoverwhelmed by the negative information of national 
government and politicians such as scandals, partisan bickering, and political incompetence 
(Kerbel 1995; Robinson and Sheehan 1983), all of which makes democratic citizens 
disappointed with politicians and political institutions. Due to the limited access to national 
politics, people tend to rely more on the media reporting that is mostly negative when assessing 
government performance. This in turn causes them to withdraw support for government. 
Decentralization helps provide alternative ways for the citizens to acquire information about 
government and governance and make their evaluation. By increasing the efficiency of policy 
making and service delivery, it signals that political system is not that incompetent. Moreover, by 
facilitating citizens to monitor and participate in policy-making processes to a greater extent, 
decentralization makes democratic and active citizens to understand that the political system is 
not as inaccessible as reported. 
 To sum, as a more democratic arrangement, decentralization¶s effect on political attitudes is 
more likely to be among democratically minded persons. But the positive moderating effect of 
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decentralization is based on the presumption that decentralization does increase performance 
efficiency on the one hand and enhance democratic governance on the other hand. As pointed out 
in the previous section, decentralization does not always produce good results. Against potential 
objections to the positive effect of decentralization, we test the following three hypotheses: 
H1: Citizens in countries with higher levels of decentralization show higher levels of  
  political trust. 
H2: Citizens with greater democratic values shows less trust for political institutions. 
H3. The negative effect of democratic value on political trust is weaker in countries with 
  higher levels of decentralization. 
 
Data, variables, and Measurements 
Dependent variable: political trust 
We draw the individual level data from the World Value Survey (WVS, the fifth wave) conducted 
during 2005-2006. We choose this dataset because among the available datasets, WVS covers the 
largest number of countries with variant social, economic, and political contexts. It hence enables 
us to conduct a comparative test of the effect of decentralization in different contexts. 
 To gauge political trust, we use the respondents¶ answers to the multi-item survey question: 
³,DPJRLQJWRQDPHDQXPEHURIorganizations. For each one, could you tell me how much 
confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very 
PXFKFRQILGHQFHRUQRQHDWDOO"´ The institutions include the armed forces, the police, the courts, 
the government, parliament, and civil service. Together they constitute the core political 
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institutions of a state. The answer ranges from 1 to 4 for each item and is recoded such that 
higher scores indicate higher levels of trust. We take the sum of the responses to the six items to 
create an index of political trust. Reliability test shows that the six items have a high level of 
internal consistency with Cronbach¶s alpha =0 .86.2  The value of this variable ranges from 6 to 
24 on a scale with 37 value points. 
 
Independent variable at country level 
The primary independent variable of this study is decentralization. Decentralization is a 
multi-dimensioned concept. To avoid the bias caused by the choice of any single measurement, 
we follow some prominent studies on this topic (Fan et al. 2009; Schneider 2006) and measure 
decentralization at three dimensions: fiscal, administrative, and political in that order. 
 Fiscal decentralization is the most popular measurement of decentralization in the literature 
(Pryor 1968, Oates 1972. Panizza 1999; Matsubayashi, 2007; Fisman andGatti.2002; Dincer, 
2010).Fiscal measurement is preferred because it is an objective measurement and public 
datasets are easily accessible. And it serves as a good indicator EHFDXVH³Whe extent of a public 
DXWKRULW\¶VDFWLYLWLHV in taxation and in the expenditure of public funds is surely a component of 
fundamental importance in determining its influence on the allocation of UHVRXUFHV´2DWHV
1972,p.197).The data are obtained from Government Finance Statistics Yearbook published by 
International Monetary Fund and where missing observations are supplemented by the reports of 
country studies. We further average the share of local expenditure and revenue over total 
                                                             
2 Principal component factor analysis also confirms that all six items load to one factor.  
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expenditure and revenue to create a composite measure of fiscal decentralization3.  
 Administrative decentralization refers to how administrative resource including personnel is 
distributed across tiers of government. We measure it by using the much simplified indicator 
³personnel decentralization´ drawn from a dataset compiled by Fan, Lin, and Treisman (2009). 
This indicator measures the share of administrative staff employed at all subnational tiers of the 
government system. It is argued that the share of local government employees is a good proxy of 
administrative decentralization since supposedly a more administratively decentralized system 
should employ a larger share of staff at the subnational levels. 
 Federalism has been a traditional measure of political decentralization (Goldsmith, 1999; 
Treisman, 2000). We measure political decentralization first by following this convention. In 
addition, we supplement it with a measurement of the degree of decision-making autonomy of 
local governments compiled by Fan, Lin, and Treisman (2009). This measurement gauges the 
extent to which subnational actors have the right to make political decisions. It includes two 
indices: ³DXWRQRP\´DQG³UHVLGXDODXWKRULW\´$XWRQRP\UHIHUVWRWKHVLWXDWLRQWKDWFRQVWLWXWLRQ
reserves exclusive right to legislate on at least one specific policy area to subnational legislatures; 
residual authority refers to a political system in which constitution gives subnational legislatures 
exclusive right to legislate on policy areas not specifically assigned in constitution. 
 At the aggregate level, we control a set of relevant factors in our full models4. The size of a 
country is believed to influence political support (Matsubayashi, 2007). We therefore include 
                                                             
3 Analysis using separate measurements yields similar findings. 
4We do not provide detailed explanations to the effect of control variables at either country level or individual level 
for the sake of brevity. 
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both the population size and territory size of countries. We also control another important control 
factor²democracy, whose measure is provided in the dataset ³Democracy and Dictatorship´ (i.e., 
DD).DD is updated IURPWKH³3ROLWLFDODQG(FRQRPLF'DWDEDVH´RULJLQDOO\SURGXFHGE\$OYDUH]
Cheibub, Limongi, and Przeworski (ACLP). DD categorizes a polity as democracy if the 
executive is elected via the legislature or the legislature is directly elected, there is more than one 
party, and the executive power alternates. We also control the effect of two important economic 
factors, GDP per capita and growth rate of GDP per capita. Summary statistics of all variables 
used in this study is presented in Appendix 1. 
 
Independent variable at individual level 
The most important independent variable at the individual level is democratic value. Given the 
global acceptance of the idea of democracy, direct questions on democratic commitment are 
likely to induce socially desirable answers. With this LQPLQGZHFKRRVHWRPHDVXUHRQH¶s 
democratic value based on the UHVSRQGHQW¶V answer to three items of a four-item question in 
WVS that asks WKHUHVSRQGHQWV¶DJUHHPHQWZLWKGHPRFUDWLFSURFHGXUHV ³+DYLQJDVWURQJOHDGHU
who does not have WRERWKHUZLWKSDUOLDPHQWDQGHOHFWLRQV´ ³+DYLQJH[SHUWVPDNLQJGHFLVLRQV
DFFRUGLQJWRZKDWWKH\WKLQNLVEHVWIRUWKHFRXQWU\´DQG³+DYLQJWKHDUP\UXOH´. While these 
items do not exhaust all the democratic procedures, together they can provide a conceptual 
anchorage and hence VHUYHDVDJRRGWHVWRIRQH¶V democratic commitment. Since explanatory 
factor analysis shows that three items load to one factor indicating the consistence in the 
UHVSRQGHQWV¶YLHZWRZDUGVGHPRFUDF\, we sum the responses as the PHDVXUHPHQWRIRQH¶V
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democratic value. 
Building upon previous studies of political trust and at the same time limited by data 
availability of WVS, we include the following controls at the individual level: gender (0 for 
female, 1 for male), age (in years), marriage experience (1 for yes), education (in years), social 
economic status (from lowest to highest), and interpersonal trust (1 for lowest trust, and 4 for 
high trust). A more detailed discussion of the effect of these variables on political trust is skipped 
for brevity. 
 
Analyses and results 
We proceed first to examine the effect of decentralization at the country level, in part as a 
replication of previous studies related to this topic. We then turn to our main analysis at the 
individual level to see whether it is in agreement of aggregate analysis. After that, we further 
investigate the indirect effect of decentralization through introducing an interaction term between 
decentralization and democratic value. Lastly, to further test the robustness of our findings we 
conduct analyses for democratic and authoritarian countries separately. For each set of analyses, 
we measure decentralization in three dimensions: fiscal, administrative, and political (federalism 
and subnational autonomy). 
 
Aggregate analysis 
We first run regression analyses (OLS) to detect whether there is a relationship between 
decentralization and political trust at the country level. To that end, we obtain the aggregate-level 
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political trust for each country by taking the country average of institutional trust. Model 1, 2, 
and 3 Table 1 are analyses of the effect of fiscal decentralization, administrative decentralization, 
and federalism, respectively. Model 4 is the analysis of the alternative measurement of political 
decentralization, local autonomy.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
The analyses in Table 1 show that, on average, fiscal decentralization and administrative 
decentralization are positively and significantly associated with political trust. Two different 
measures of political decentralization, however, are negatively and significantly associated with 
political trust. This seemingly conflicting pattern conforms to the findings of previous related 
studies. Fiscal decentralization, as reported in Huther and Shah (1998), De Mello and Barenstein 
(2001), and other studies, is accompanied with lower perceived corruption as measured by 
Transparency International and World Bank (both are measures at country level). But some 
scholars found that federalism, on the other hand, is associated with a higher level of perceived 
corruption (Treisman, 2000; Goldsmith, 1999) or perceived government accountability 
(Escobar-Lemmon and Ross 2013).  
 
Individual-level analysis 
Turning our attention to the respondents¶ expressed institutional trust at the individual level, we 
employ a random-intercept multi-level model to estimate the effect of decentralization on 
political trust. This is because the causal relationship between the two varies across both 
countries and individuals. Although the number of aggregate units is reasonable large (47 
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countries in total), we estimate the multilevel models separately for each of the four 
country-level measures of decentralization.  In order to test the robustness of our analyses, we 
first conduct a set of analyses that only include measures of decentralization as the independent 
variable at the country level (Model 5-8), and then include a full set of variables at the country 
level(Model 9-12). As shown in Table 2, both analyses yield similar results. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Results in Table 2 are consistently different from findings emerged from country-level analyses, 
showing that regardless of its specific measures, decentralization is not significantly associated 
with political trust at the individual level at all. This indicates that decentralization does not exert 
a direct impact on how people perceive various political institutions and authorities. In other 
words, citizens do not evaluate their government more (or less) preferably simply because its 
power and authority are more devolved to subnational levels. To rule out that the insignificant 
association is artificially caused by our operationalization of political trust (the average of six 
items: government, police, armed forces, parliament, police, and civil services), we conduct the 
same set of analyses for each of the six political institutions and the results are consistent.5 
These consistent findings challenge the extant literature in several ways. First, the significant 
association between decentralization and its alleged political consequences at aggregate level 
reported in previous studies fails to establish at the individual level. And the significant 
association at the individual level in several single-country studies is falsified too when more 
countries are included in analysis. Moreover, the insignificance of the relationship at the 
                                                             
5The additional analyses are not reported and available upon request.   
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individual level suggests country-level analyses of decentralization may fall prey to the 
³HFRORJLFDOIDOODFLHV´ (Seligson 2002)The observed aggregate association in fact cannot fully 
reveal the micro mechanism linking decentralization ordinary people¶s confidence in political 
institutions. 
 The relationship of other variables at the individual level to political trust does demonstrate 
many meaningful patterns in a consistent manner. The results of the multilevel analyses confirm 
our expectation that people with a higher level of democratic value are more critical of political 
establishments than those with less affection for democracy. It is the higher standard that 
contemporary politicians and political institutions fall short, causing democratic-minded citizens 
disenchanted.  The results alsRVXJJHVWWKDWSROLWLFDOWUXVWLVVWURQJO\VKDSHGE\UHVSRQGHQWV¶
socio-demographic characteristics. Younger, more educated, less affluent and less socially 
trusting citizens are less trustful of government.   
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Cross-level interaction 
Then, what causes the significant association between decentralization and political trust at the 
aggregate level while there is no direct effect of decentralization at the individual level? 
Although exerting no direct impact, decentralization, as we argued, can shape the public¶s 
perception of political institutions via affecting the relationship between political trust and its 
correlates, in particular, democratic value. We therefore include a cross-level interaction term 
between democratic value and decentralization as measured in different ways. The analytical 
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results of these models are reported in Table 3 (Model 13-16)6. As expected, while democratic 
value is negatively associated with political trust, its interactions with both fiscal decentralization 
and administrative decentralization are positive and significant (Model 13 and 14). That is, with 
a higher level of fiscal or administrative decentralization in a given country, the negative effect 
of democratic value on political trust decreases significantly. This indicates that vertical 
dispersion of fiscal and administrative power mitigates the negative association between 
democratic value and political trust.  
In order to present more meaningful interpretation of the moderating effects discussed above, 
we plot the marginal effects of fiscal and administrative decentralization based on Model 13 and 
Model 14 (Figure 1-a & 1-b).Both plots show that the effect of democratic value is negative and 
significant at lower values of decentralization. The negative effects of democratic value, however, 
decrease in magnitude with higher levels of decentralization, and it becomes insignificant when 
decentralization reaches its higher end. In short, decentralization helps attenuating the potential 
detrimental effect of democratic value on political trust. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
 In contrast, the two measurements of political decentralization, federalism (Model 15) and 
local autonomy (Model 16), do not have a positive interactive effect with democratic value. 
While the interaction between federalism and democratic value is not significant (Model 15), the 
                                                             
6 The results of simpler models including those only with primary country-level independent variables are not 
reported. 
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interaction between autonomy and democratic value is significant and negative (Model 16). This 
finding indicates that with higher degrees of autonomy of subnational units, people with greater 
democratic value are more critical of political institutions. Marginal effect plot in Figure 1-c 
shows that the effect of democratic value stays negative at all levels of local autonomy, and the 
negative effect increases in magnitude with a higher level of autonomy. Therefore, it shows that 
compared to other dimensions of decentralization, political decentralization entails a dynamic 
that aggravates the negative feelings of democratically minded citizens about the political system, 
an important issue to be addressed in the next section. 
 
Split-sample analysis 
Presumably, decentralization can lead to varying political consequences under different regime 
settings. The above analytical results show that democracy is consistently negatively associated 
political trust, in both aggregate and individual-level analyses. We therefore split the global 
sample based on whether a country is democratic or not and conduct the same set of analyses for 
two types of countries separately (Table 4). Model 17 through Model 20 are analyses of 
democratic countries; Model 21 through Model 24 are analyses of autocratic countries. Provided 
the smaller numbers of countries in split samples as compared to global sample, both set of 
analyses include only one independent variable, decentralization, at the country level and its 
interaction with democratic value.7 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
                                                             
7Analyses using a full set of aggregate variables yield similar findings. 
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The results indicate that the political impacts of decentralization are stronger in democratic 
countries than in authoritarian countries. In democratic countries, the pattern of the moderating 
effect of decentralization is consistent with that of the main analyses in Table 3. Both fiscal 
decentralization and administrative decentralization mitigates the negative effect of democratic 
value on trust; but local autonomy, an indicator of political decentralization, amplifies that 
negative effect. The interactive effect of decentralization and democratic value is less evident in 
autocratic countries. In those countries, only administrative administration works to boost 
political trust of institutions through decreasing the negative effect of democratic value. Fiscal 
decentralization does not make the democratically-minded person to believe in authoritarian 
institutions at all; and political decentralization has no significant indirect effect either. These 
findings imply that decentralization as an institutional reform does not influence people¶ view of 
political institutions in authoritarian regimes as much as it does in democratic countries. 
Nevertheless, given the small number of authoritarian countries in WVS sample, we are cautious 
not to infer much about the insignificance of the effect of decentralization on political trust.8  
 
Conclusion 
With ever increasing burden of modern governments in managing domestic affairs, national 
government around the world are either forced or motivated to reallocate authority downwards to 
                                                             
8To deal with the limited number of cases at the country level, we conducted multilevel analyses 
using Bayesian approach as suggested by Stegmuler (2013) and obtained similar findings. 
Results are available upon request. 
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subnational and local units of government. As a result, citizens are exposed to more daily 
operation of government and involved in more political or policy-making process. Does such a 
vertical dispersion of political power and authority reshape the relationship between government 
and its citizenry? Does it change how ordinary people perceive various political institutions and 
actors? In particular, does this institutional reform help restore the public confidence in political 
institutions that have been declining in recent decades? To answer these questions, this study 
provides a much-needed comparative analysis of the effect of decentralization on political trust.  
Our analysis first disproves the direct effect of decentralization on individual attitudes in 
spite of their significant association at the country level. We then show that the trust-fostering 
function of decentralization at two dimensions (fiscal and administrative) works through 
mitigating the negative effect of democratic value on political trust. However, one measure of 
political decentralization±subnational political autonomy±aggravates the negative effect of 
democratic value. 
The different or even opposite effect of decentralization measured in different dimensions 
political trust warrants further discussions. The finding that political decentralization aggravates 
the negative effect of democratic value suggests that power devolution in political sense is not 
necessarily beneficial for the government in terms of gaining public confidence. This is probably 
due to the unique nature of political decentralization compared to the two other dimensions of 
decentralization. In democracies, if political decentralization operates inappropriately, the 
decentralized political making process makes stalemate, partisan politics, and other problems of 
democratic political process more salient and thus critical citizen are more disappointed by 
24 
democratic system. In autocracies, the decentralization of political process can make a 
democratically-minded person more aware of the undemocratic nature of the political system that 
has been concealed by propaganda. In either case, democratically-minded persons get more 
dissatisfied with the political system and hence more likely distrust its political institutions when 
they are more exposed to political process in a decentralized system. 
Another possible explanation to this ³reinforcing´ effect of political decentralization has to 
do with ³vertical clarity of UHVSRQVLELOLW\´ (Anderson 2005). One of the most important 
developments in studies of citizens¶ perception of government performance dealt with the 
³FODULW\RIUHVSRQVLELOLW\´LQGLIIHUHQWSROLWLFDOand institutional contexts. While Powell and 
Whitten (1993) showed that horizontal clarity of responsibility within the national governing 
institutions significantly alters how ordinary people evaluate incumbent government, Anderson 
(2005) finds that similar patterns exist along the vertical angle. Particularly, to the extent that 
political decentralization demarcates responsibility between the national and subnational 
government more than does fiscal or administrative decentralization, it leave less room for 
governments to engage in blame shifting and credit taking for various performances. Therefore, 
the negative effects of democratic values on political trust are less likely to be muted when the 
clarity of responsibility become stronger as a result of political decentralization. 
Although political decentralization has a negative effect, decentralization policies overall 
help rebuild political trust among the public. This is so because it is the administrative and fiscal 
domains that most governments focus on when implementing decentralization. How political 
powers are arranged vertically has usually been set by a country¶s constitution and is difficult to 
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be changed. Compared to political decentralization how administrative authorities are distributed 
or how revenue or expenditure is assigned among different tiers of government is much less 
formidable to change and is often the focus of the of government reforms. Although such policy 
reforms cannot directly increase the affection of all people for the government, it does help meet 
the rising democratic demand of the public. 
26 
27 
Table 1. The Effect of Decentralization on Political Trust (Aggregate Analysis) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Fiscal Administrative Political  
Federal           Autonomy   
Decentralization 2.77*** 1.52*** -0.26*** -0.48*** 
 (0.054) (0.041) (0.016) (0.015) 
Surface -0.34*** -0.24*** -0.19*** -0.22*** 
 (0.0052) (0.0060) (0.0054) (0.0050) 
Population 0.42*** 0.27*** 0.40*** 0.41*** 
 (0.0055) (0.0068) (0.0056) (0.0056) 
Democracy -2.29*** -1.83*** -1.93*** -1.82*** 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) 
GDP pc 0.22*** 0.079*** 0.059*** 0.016*** 
 (0.0072) (0.0067) (0.0050) (0.0054) 
Growth 0.011*** 0.10*** -0.0049** -0.016*** 
 (0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0024) (0.0025) 
Constant 11.7*** 13.6*** 13.2*** 13.7*** 
 (0.091) (0.082) (0.058) (0.062) 
R2 0.32 0.27 0.24 0.25 
No. countries (respond.) 38(66005) 32(55221) 45(79517) 42(74983) 
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 Model 5 
Fiscal 
Model 6 
Admin. 
Model 7 
Federal 
Model 8 
Autonomy 
Model 9 
Fiscal 
Model 10 
Admin. 
Model 11 
Federal 
Model 12 
Autonomy 
Ind. level 
Sex 
 
-0.15*** 
 
-0.17*** 
 
-0.16*** 
 
-0.17*** 
 
-0.16*** 
 
-0.17*** 
 
-0.16*** 
 
-0.17*** 
 (0.034) (0.038) (0.032) (0.033) (0.034) (0.038) (0.033) (0.033) 
Age 0.0093*** 0.0079*** 0.0093*** 0.0084*** 0.0093*** 0.0079*** 0.0088*** 0.0084*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Education -0.021*** -0.012*** -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.012*** -0.019*** -0.020*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0027) (0.0027) 
Social status 0.13*** 0.082*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.082*** 0.100*** 0.11*** 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) 
Interpersonal trust 0.48*** 0.44*** 0.47*** 0.45*** 0.48*** 0.44*** 0.47*** 0.45*** 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.018) (0.019) 
Democratic value -0.13*** -0.11*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.11*** -0.13*** -0.13*** 
 (0.0086) (0.0096) (0.0081) (0.0084) (0.0087) (0.0096) (0.0083) (0.0084) 
Constant 13.8*** 14.0*** 14.8*** 15.1*** 10.7*** 12.7*** 11.4*** 12.0*** 
 
Country level 
(0.67) (1.02) (0.36) (0.41) (3.69) (3.67) (2.53) (2.69) 
Decentralization         
 2.91 2.35 0.084 -0.23 2.11 0.57 -0.55 -0.41 
Surface (2.01) (1.84) (0.68) (0.68) (2.28) (2.15) (0.70) (0.64) 
     -0.21 -0.11 -0.015 -0.090 
Population     (0.22) (0.27) (0.24) (0.22) 
     0.34 0.24 0.30 0.34 
Democracy     (0.23) (0.30) (0.23) (0.24) 
     -2.91*** -2.78*** -2.21*** -2.14*** 
GDP pc     (0.77) (0.87) (0.71) (0.75) 
     0.42 0.27 0.29 0.22 
Growth     (0.30) (0.32) (0.21) (0.23) 
         
Ind. variance 12.47 12.50 12.73 12.65 12.44 12.50 12.74 12.65 
Country. variance 3.87 3.83 4.09 4.27 2.66 2.83 3.21 3.33 
N. (country) 45578(39) 36434(32) 51489(47) 47537(42) 44710(38) 36434(32) 49670(45) 47537(42) 
Log likelihood -122285 -97802 -138694 -127903 -119900 -97797 -133803 -127897 
Multilevel model with random intercept; Standard errors in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. 
Table 2. Estimation of the effect of decentralization on institutional trust (individual level analysis) 
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Multilevel model with random intercept; Standard errors in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** 
p<.01. 
 Model 13 
Fiscal 
Model 14 
Admin. 
Model 15 
Federal 
Model 16 
Autonomy 
Ind. level 
Sex 
 
-0.16*** 
 
-0.17*** 
 
-0.16*** 
 
-0.17*** 
 (0.034) (0.038) (0.033) (0.033) 
Age 0.0093*** 0.0079*** 0.0088*** 0.0085*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Education -0.020*** -0.012*** -0.019*** -0.020*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0027) (0.0027) 
Social status 0.13*** 0.082*** 0.100*** 0.11*** 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) 
Interpersonal trust 0.47*** 0.44*** 0.47*** 0.45*** 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.018) (0.019) 
Democratic value -0.17*** -0.24*** -0.14*** -0.11*** 
 (0.018) (0.027) (0.010) (0.011) 
Constant 11.0*** 13.8*** 11.5*** 11.9*** 
 (3.69) (3.67) (2.54) (2.69) 
Country level     
Decentralization 1.05 -1.62 -0.69 -0.097 
 (2.33) (2.19) (0.72) (0.66) 
Surface -0.21 -0.11 -0.016 -0.090 
 (0.22) (0.27) (0.24) (0.22) 
Population 0.34 0.24 0.30 0.34 
 (0.23) (0.30) (0.23) (0.24) 
Democracy -2.90*** -2.81*** -2.22*** -2.14*** 
 (0.77) (0.87) (0.71) (0.74) 
GDP pc 0.41 0.27 0.29 0.22 
 (0.30) (0.32) (0.21) (0.23) 
Growth 0.012 0.077 -0.00012 -0.0029 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.11) (0.12) 
Cross-level interaction     
Decent.*demo. value 0.13** 0.25*** 0.017 -0.037** 
 (0.054) (0.050) (0.018) (0.017) 
Ind. variance 12.44 12.49 12.74 12.65 
Country variance 2.66 2.83 3.21 3.32 
No. of obs. (country) 44710(38) 36434(32) 49670(45) 47537(42) 
Log likelihood -119897 -97784 -133803 -127895 
Table 3. Estimation of the effect of decentralization on institutional trust (cross-level interaction) 
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Multilevel model with random intercept; Standard errors in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
  Democracy   Autocracy  
 Model 17 
Fiscal 
Model 18 
Admin. 
Model 19 
Federal 
Model 20 
Autonomy 
Model 21 
Fiscal 
Model 22 
Admin. 
Model 23 
Federal 
Model 24 
Autonomy 
Ind. level         
Sex -0.13*** -0.20*** -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.19** -0.076 -0.17** -0.18** 
 (0.037) (0.041) (0.035) (0.037) (0.076) (0.088) (0.069) (0.070) 
Age 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.0017 -0.0033 0.0013 0.00069 
 (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0027) (0.0027) 
Education -0.018*** -0.011*** -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.036*** -0.020** -0.040*** -0.042*** 
 (0.0028) (0.0031) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0077) (0.0094) (0.0070) (0.0072) 
Social status 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.22*** -0.082** -0.23*** -0.094*** -0.088** 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.020) (0.021) (0.039) (0.044) (0.035) (0.035) 
Interpersonal trust 0.40*** 0.38*** 0.42*** 0.40*** 0.68*** 0.57*** 0.58*** 0.57*** 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.020) (0.021) (0.042) (0.045) (0.037) (0.038) 
Democratic value -0.20*** -0.24*** -0.15*** -0.13*** -0.092*** -0.24*** -0.087*** -0.074*** 
 (0.021) (0.030) (0.011) (0.012) (0.033) (0.059) (0.022) (0.023) 
Constant 13.6*** 15.5*** 14.0*** 14.1*** 15.6*** 15.4*** 17.3*** 17.3*** 
 (0.68) (0.96) (0.34) (0.40) (1.28) (1.74) (0.84) (0.87) 
Country level         
Decentralization 1.71 -2.23 0.47 0.67 3.97 3.81 -1.57 -1.14 
 (2.05) (1.77) (0.68) (0.65) (3.98) (2.93) (1.42) (1.61) 
Cross-level interaction         
Decent.*demo. value 0.15** 0.19*** 0.0094 -0.044** 0.070 0.38*** -0.0078 -0.032 
 (0.063) (0.057) (0.021) (0.020) (0.10) (0.11) (0.034) (0.034) 
Ind. variance 11.05 10.89 11.24 11.07 16.40 17.00 16.48 16.39 
Country variance 2.43 2.29 2.62 2.76 4.86 2.86 5.18 5.45 
N. (country) 33859(31) 27249(25) 37133(35) 33701(31) 11719(8) 9185(7) 14356(12) 13836(11) 
Log. likelihood -88804 -71268 -97707 -88422 -33045 -23062 -40519 -39013 
Table 4. Estimation of the effect of decentralization on institutional trust (split analysis) 
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Figure 1. Marginal effect of democratic value at all levels of decentralization 
 
    
a. Fiscal decentralization             b. Administrative decentralization          c. Political decentralization: local autonomy 
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Appendix 1. Summary statistics 
 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
political trust 81874 15.18  4.30  6 24 
sex 82896 0.48  0.50  0 1 
age 82725 41.41  16.48  15 98 
Education (at what age finished 
education) 
67434 19.30  6.42  1 97 
social status 68901 2.63  1.00  1 5 
Interpersonal trust 81298 2.35  0.97  1 4 
Democratic value 75650 8.32  2.17 3 12 
Fiscal decentralization 67225 0.29  0.16  0.041 0.67 
Administrative decentralization 55221 0.53  0.20  0.19 0.93 
Federalism 81740 0.30  0.46  0 1 
Local autonomy 74983 0.33  0.47  0 1 
Surface area (log) 79517 6.33  1.74  1.63 9.75 
Population (log) 80737 10.35  1.52  6.92 14.08 
democracy 81740 0.67  0.47  0 1 
GDP pc (log) 81740 8.10  1.55  5.0039 10.61 
growth rate 81740 3.86  2.73  -3.2 10.6 
